This paper considers a matching model of the labour market where workers, with private information on their quality, signal to firms that also differ in quality. Signals allow assortative matching in which the highest quality workers send the highest signals and are hired by the best firms. Matching is considered both when wages are rigid (non-transferable utility) and when they are fully flexible (utility is transferable). In both cases, equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on the distributions of types of workers and the distribution of firms. This is in contrast with separating equilibria of the standard model which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. With sticky wages, despite incomplete information, equilibrium investment in education by low ability workers can be inefficiently low and this distortion can become worse in a more competitive environment. In contrast, with flexible wages, greater competition improves efficiency.
Introduction
It is now more than thirty years since Spence (1973) introduced the idea that investment in education could be undertaken as a signal to prospective employers. Although Spence's classic work provided many important insights, it is arguable that it provides an incomplete picture of the labour market phenomena it set out to model. In particular, while workers differ in quality, firms are in effect identical and offer the same wages. This is to ignore the role of educational achievement in effectively allocating heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Introducing differentiated employers may also resolve another known problem with the Spence model. There, in any separating equilibrium, strategies and outcomes, such as wages, do not respond to changes in the relative frequency of high and low quality workers. That is, strangely, the wages of skilled workers do not respond to changes in the supply of either skilled or unskilled labour. Here, in the modified model, workers compete for high quality jobs that in are scarce supply. Consequently, the quality and quantity of workers and the relative supply of jobs all matter for equilibrium outcomes. This type of model is important because many real world labour markets, particularly for professionals, clearly have vertical differentiation on both sides of the market. There is careful effort devoted by both sides to ensuring a good match between employer and employee, and intense competition for high ranked employers and for star candidates. There is a distinct resemblance to Becker's (1973) marriage matching model which allows for differences in quality on both sides of the market. The literature on matching, however, has assumed that employment decisions are made on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of candidates. This is to ignore the clear competition between candidates in educational achievement in order to achieve top jobs. Equally, while the literature on tournaments in labour economics goes back to Lazear and Rosen (1981) , tournaments are usually assumed to be internal to a firm. Here, I look at what I call a "matching tournament" model of a labour market, in which agents make an investment decision before participating in a frictionless matching market. If that investment is a signal of otherwise unobservable ability, then matching tournaments marry aspects of both Spence's and Becker's models. Combined with the comparative statics methodology developed here, matching tournaments permit the analysis of how matching considerations affect the level of competition in signaling activity. This paper investigates matching tournaments under incomplete information in two situations, where wages are sticky and when they are fully flexible. Workers undertake visible investment, for example in education, to signal underlying heterogeneous ability. Employers are also vertically differentiated, but this is observable. In a separating equilibrium, there is positive assortative matching with high quality workers sending high signals and being matched with high quality firms. Equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on the distributions of characteristics of both firms and workers. This is is also shown to hold, even when wages are determined by bargaining between workers and firms (transferable utility), provided the stronger assumption that workers and firms are complements in production is imposed. That is, there is a dependence on demand and supply absent in Spence's original model. An increase in the quantity or quality of labour, or a decrease in the quality of jobs, increases the competitiveness of the labour market. Under sticky wages, this leads to higher investment by high types, but low types are discouraged and invest less. In a more difficult situation, low ranking workers have little prospect of a good job and so have a lower incentive to compete. With flexible wages, investment and wages fall at each level of ability and wages fall for each level of investment.
Signaling models are well known for generating inefficiently high investment in signals. But in the current matching tournament environment, this is married with a hold-up problem: workers may not take into account the benefit of their investment to potential partners and hence invest inefficiently little. When wages are flexible, the signaling effect is stronger and investment is everywhere too high. However, when wages are not flexible, the hold-up effect dominates for low ability workers who will invest below the social optimum. High achievers, in contrast, can over invest.
Even more interesting are the way that the level of efficiency responds to changes, such as an increase in quantity or quality of the supply of labour. Greater competition leads to lower and thus more efficient investment under flexible wages. But, when wages are not fully flexible, as greater competition discourages low ability workers who already invest too little, greater competition makes investment less efficient. If one takes the labour market in the USA to be closer to the flexible model and European markets to be closer the less flexible, the two different forms of matching tournament offer a way of comparing the differing effect of demand and supply shocks on these different labour markets. In particular, what this analysis suggests is that, when wages are not fully flexible, there is a serious poverty trap at the bottom end of the distribution. Greater competition discourages rather than encourages low ability workers to invest in human capital, and decreases rather than increases efficiency. This paper blends elements from a number of different theories, so it is important to be clear about its contribution. First, it introduces assignment issues to labour market signaling. While the idea of education as a signal is well known, the hypothesis that the type of signal sent determines which kind of job is obtained with which employer has received surprisingly little attention. Strangely, there has been more written on how conspicuous consumption signals suitability to potential social partners (Pesendorfer (1995) , Rege (2001) ). This is despite the fact that educational achievement clearly has this allocative function in real world labour markets. Second, by doing this it permits new comparative statics results. While matching tournaments were introduced by Postlewaite (1992, 1995) , this paper is the first to look at comparative statics in such models. 1 Here, I find that equilibrium strategies and utility depend on both the distribution of workers' characteristics and the distribution of quality of jobs available, something not true in the classic signaling model of Spence (1973) , or its generalization to a continuous type space (see Spence (1974) , Mailath (1987) ).
Finally, while allocation is the primary concern of the literature on the assignment of workers to jobs and in the literature on matching, it has always been assumed that matching is on the basis of intrinsic characteristics rather than choices made by participants. Thus, in pure matching models, while it has recently been discovered that it is possible to carry out similar comparative statics exercises (Costrell and Loury (2004) ), it is not possible to say anything about competition for matches or workers' investment decisions and whether the resulting investment is efficient. Thus, in summary, standard signaling models capture competition between workers but lack sensible comparative statics. Assignment and matching models have the comparative statics but lack competition. This paper shows that matching tournaments have both.
It is important to understand why signaling in matching tournaments has different comparative statics properties than Spence's original model. In the original model of Spence (1973 Spence ( , 1974 equilibrium separating strategies and payoffs depend only on the absolute characteristics of workers. Specifically, in a separating equilibrium of the classic model, employers can infer the exact productivity of workers from their level of education. As a result, the signaler's equilibrium payoffs are determined by the absolute level of her productivity, for example, she ends up being paid her marginal product. Of course, there are other equilibria in Spence's model. For example, in a pooling equilibrium, the wage paid is equal to average worker quality and depends on the distribution of ability. But notice that this implies that if worker quality rises so do wages. In contrast, it is shown that in the separating outcome considered here an increase in worker quality causes wages to fall at each ability level and for each level of investment. Pooling equilibria also exist in the current model but are effectively no different from pooling outcomes in the Spence model.
In contrast, in the separating equilibrium of the current model, a signaler's payoff will instead depend on which type of job she is able to obtain. High quality jobs are in fixed supply and allocated to the most successful candidates. So, an agent's job market outcome will depend on her rank in the distribution of types in the population.
2 Furthermore, changes in the distribution of jobs available or in quality of other workers will change her competitive position and hence, how much she has to signal to communicate successfully that she is a leading candidate. The classic model can be derived as a special case of our model simply by setting the two distributions on either side of the market to be identical. Postlewaite (1992, 2001 ) pioneered the analysis of matching tournaments but concentrated on this special case.
3
One obtains the comparative statics results by changing one distribution while holding the other constant, something clearly not possible if they are constrained to be equal to each other. Thus, in the classic model, equilibrium strategies depend only on an incentive compatibility condition derived from individual preferences and do not change in response to competitive pressures. This paper looks at labour market matching under two differing assumptions, first with constraints on wage setting and second when wages are flexible. This difference corresponds to the distinction between non-transferable utility (NTU) and transferable utility (TU) found in the matching literature. It is assumed that any match between a worker and a firm produces a surplus. In the NTU case, there are exogenous limits on how this surplus can be divided. Wages can still depend on the value of the match but are not fully flexible as in TU. While TU might seem the more natural assumption to many economists, the NTU matching tournament may be a better fit for some real world matching markets. For example, Bulow and Levin (2006) observe that wages paid for medical residents are "impersonal". That is, they are set before the labour market commences and are not sensitive to the individual characteristics of the candidate who is hired (but vary across hiring institutions). In Europe it is often even more extreme: in most equivalent professional labour markets, wages are set at the national level and so there is no variation at all. For example, within most European countries, each university will pay new faculty the same starting salary.
One might think that wage rigidity is the source of the positional effects found in matching tournaments, where high ranking workers earn rents from their high relative position. Imagine that the quality of workers is poor, the best of that poor bunch would get the best job even if low quality in absolute terms. In contrast, if wages were flexible (the TU case), one might think that any such positional rents would be bargained away: low quality workers would be offered low wages. In the end, just as in the classical models, workers would be paid their product. It is shown in Section 3 of this paper that this is not the case. Provided that the additional assumption is made that the attributes of workers and firms are strict complements in production, equilibrium wages, signaling and welfare all depend on the distributions of characteristics of both firms and workers.
Therefore, the competitive situation will respond to changes in the distribution of workers and to changes in the distribution of firms. It is possible to carry out both forms of comparative statics. For example, one can look at the effect of an improvement in the quality of workers or an increase in their relative quantity. Equally, one can model a change in the quality of jobs by comparing equilibrium outcomes under one distribution of jobs and under another that is stochastically higher. An improvement in the quality or quantity of workers or a decrease in the quality of jobs increases the competitiveness of the market and lowers workers' utility at each level of ability. Under NTU, the effect on signaling varies with high ability workers investing more in a more competitive market and low ability workers investing less. When utility is transferable, that is, there is bargaining over wages, an increase in competitiveness decreases investment and wages at every ability level. Importantly, the effect of an increase in the quality of firms is equal but opposite to the effect of an increase in the quality of workers: it raises wages and workers' utility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces matching tournaments with incomplete information under the assumption of non-transferable utility. Section 3 solves the model with transferable utility. Section 4 looks at the comparative statics generated by changes in the quality of jobs or of workers. Section 5 compares efficiency under NTU and under TU. Section 6 looks at the impact of there being a long side to the market, that is, a proportion of workers do not get jobs. The question is what are the effects of a rise in unemployment. Section 7 compares this type of signaling model with existing signaling and matching models. Section 8 concludes.
Matching Tournaments
In this section, I outline a model of a matching tournament, where the prizes of a standard tournament are replaced by matching opportunities. I have in mind three prime examples. The first is students competing for places at college. The second is the marriage market. The third is a market for jobs. For example, students in the final year of graduate school seek faculty positions at universities. I will use the terminology of this last case and talk about workers and firms. I also make the simplifying assumption that workers have a common ordering over potential jobs. That is, in the academic job market for example, all graduating students agree on the best university position, the second best and so on. In contrast, while the employers all agree that they would like to hire the most able candidate, the ability of candidates is not observable. Rather potential employers must infer the ability of workers from an investment decision, for example in education, made before matching. We will look at equilibria where all employers will rank all workers in terms of this investment. In the current work, the employers have no investment decision of their own to make. Indeed, one can also consider, as a special case of the current model, situations such as sports tournaments where the "firms" are only inanimate monetary prizes, which are assigned to candidates according to their performance.
The model can be considered as an incomplete information version of the model introduced by Postlewaite (1992, 2001) , hereafter CMP. However, we generalize their model to allow for different distributions of characteristics on the two sides of the market. This will allow both for a richer model and for comparative statics analysis of the effect of changes in those distributions. This is also how our model is differentiated from standard signaling models. As is shown in Section 7, a more traditional signaling model can be derived by setting the distributions on the two sides of the market to be identical.
There are two populations of agent: workers and firms. They are differentiated in quality with a worker's type being z with z distributed on [z,z] with z ≥ 0 according to the distribution G(z). The distribution G(z) is twice differentiable with strictly positive bounded density g(z). Firms are also differentiated in their attribute s which has the twice differentiable distribution function H(s) on [s,s] and strictly positive bounded density h(s) (in the case of a sports tournament H(s) is just the distribution of prize money). There are two principal differences between firms and workers. First, the type of a worker is her private information, but the types of firms are common knowledge. Second, workers must make an investment decision prior to attempting to match with firms. In particular, they must choose a visible level of output or investment x from the positive real line [0, ∞). Following Spence, this could be a choice of education level. An worker's type z has the general interpretation as her ability, and is positively related with the worker's productivity. After the choice of output/investment, matching will take place, with one worker matching with each firm. A match between a worker of type z investing x with a firm of type s will produce output π(z, s, x), where π(·) is a smooth increasing function. As we will see, stable matching will be positive and assortative. That is, workers with high x will match with firms with high s.
In this matching tournament, an equilibrium will have two components: a strategy for the workers x(z) that gives the choice of investment as a function of worker type, and a matching scheme that assigns workers to firms. For an equilibrium, the matching scheme must be stable given observable investment and the strategy x(z).
4 Second, no worker must have an incentive to deviate given the strategies of her fellow workers and the matching scheme in place in the matching phase. The equilibrium is therefore, like that of CMP (2001), a hybrid. The second stage of the tournament is treated as a cooperative game, in requiring stability in the matching process, but the choice of investments in the first stage is non-cooperative. We call such an equilibrium symmetric if all workers use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(z) from type to output.
Remember we have assumed that the product from a match is π(z, s, x). Assume further that (a) π(·) is twice continuously differentiable; (b) π(·) is (weakly) increasing in all its arguments. Within that general framework, we can consider two special cases.
Story A: Valueless Signaling. Here the observable action x serves no use in itself to firms. However, it may act as signal of a worker's type z and the utility of firms is increasing in the type of their match. For example, as in Spence's (1973) classic model, education may signal ability. The product of a match is strictly increasing in the worker's type:
Story B: Constructive Signaling. Here the observable action x increases the product of a match. However, the product also depends on a worker's unobservable type z. For example, education may both signal ability and increase human capital. The product of a match is strictly increasing in both a worker's type and her investment:
We now consider preferences under non-transferable utility (NTU) (we go on to consider transferable utility in Section 3).
5 Let us assume, similar to Spence (1974) , that utility for workers is of the following form
where b stands for benefits and c for costs. Costs, to make a a separating equilibrium possible, will be increasing in investment x but decreasing in a worker's ability z. As for a worker's benefits, in general, NTU means that the benefits arising from the match between firm and worker are in some way indivisible and/or non-excludable. Within that broad class, there are two principal stories that have been used in the literature. First, if we interpret the firm's type s as its level of prestige, we could have b(z, s, x) = w + s. That is, the benefit from the job is a fixed wageŵ plus its prestige s. 6 Second, instead taking s to be a productive asset, such as the firm's existing human or physical capital, some form of wage inflexibility would justify b(z, s, x) = απ(z, s, x) for some α ∈ (0, 1). Social conventions or legal constraints fix wages as a fixed proportion of the product of a match.
To allow consistency with either story (and others), let us assume the following properties: (i) b(·) and c(·) are twice continuously differentiable;
Firms receive the product π(·) from a match, less wages. We have assumed either that wages are fixed, w =ŵ, or that wages are a fixed proportion of the product from a match, w = απ.
7 Thus, firms, in their choice of worker, simply prefer workers that generate the highest product. That is, the profits of firms are strictly increasing in z (Story A) or in both x and z (Story B).
Following CMP (1992, 1998 
where P denotes "preferred to", with both preferences holding strictly.
The first condition is the equivalent in a continuum of requiring exactly one worker being matched to one firm. The second is the stability condition standard in most matching problems, that requires that matches made are not subject to unravelling in the sense that it should not be possible to find a worker and a firm who would prefer to match with each other in place of their current matches. It is assumed, in the current NTU model, that workers' utility is strictly increasing in firm type s which is public information, thus a worker prefers firm i over firm j if and only if s i > s j . Firms have to choose over workers on the basis of visible investment x, while their type z is hidden. We make the standard assumption that firms' beliefs must be consistent with equilibrium strategies. The case on which we focus is where the workers' equilibrium strategy x(z) is strictly increasing. Then, firms must believe that a higher investment implies higher ability. Thus, under Story A or Story B, a firm will prefer worker i over worker j if and only if x i > x j .
Suppose for the moment that there exists a symmetric equilibrium strategy x(z) that is differentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show that such an equilibrium exists). Let us aggregate all the output decisions of the workers into a distribution summarized by a distribution function F (x). A strictly increasing symmetric strategy implies that in equilibrium an agent of type z i who produces x(z i ) would have a position in the distribution of output F (x(z i )) equal to his rank G(z i ) in the distribution of ability. This enables the firms to infer which worker is in fact the most able. This in turn allows the matches to be made through the following assortative matching mechanism so that workers with high (respectively low) x are matched with firms with high (respectively low) s. More specifically, a worker's rank in level of output determines the rank of his match. That is, a worker making a choice x i will achieve a match of value
Then, we can show that the assortative scheme outlined above is stable. That is, we can find no worker and firm who would both prefer each other in place of their current match.
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Lemma 1 Suppose all workers adopt a symmetric strictly increasing strategy x(z), then the assortative matching, such for a worker of type z i for any z i ∈ [z,z], with output x i = x(z i ) her match is of type s i , where
is the only stable matching.
We now derive a symmetric equilibrium strategy for the workers. Suppose all agents adopt a strictly increasing differentiable strategy x(z). Then the equilibrium relationship (2) implies that we can define the function
which gives the equilibrium match of a worker of type z that depends on both G and H. Note that we have S 0 (z) = g(z)/h(S(z)). This implies an equilibrium utility of the form:
Note that utility, through S(z), now depends on both the distribution G(z) of workers' types and the distribution H(s) of firms' characteristics. Furthermore, each worker's utility is increasing in her rank G(z) in the workforce.
Suppose positive assortative matching was assigned by a central planner, rather than determined by the workers' competitive choice of investment. Then, what level of investment would workers choose? Since workers can gain from their own investment x, their choice will be greater than zero if indeed b x > 0. This level of investment that is optimal in the absence of matching considerations will be useful as a point of comparison with the Nash equilibrium level of investment that will eventually be derived.
holds at every level of z ∈ [z,z]. The function N(z) is called the privately optimal level of investment x under NTU.
Suppose now one agent produces x(ẑ) in place of her equilibrium choice x(z) and then choosesẑ to maximize her payoff. Her reduced form utility is U (z, S(ẑ), x(ẑ)). This gives a first order condition
Now, in a symmetric equilibrium it must be thatẑ = z. Using this and rearranging the resulting first order condition, we have the following differential equation.
This differential equation will give us our equilibrium strategy, in combination with the boundary condition x(z) = N(z). That is, the lowest ranked worker acts as though matching considerations did not matter. This reflects the equilibrium competitive response to the expectation that one is going to come last.
Proposition 1
The unique solution to the differential equation (6) with the boundary condition, x(z) = N(z), and the assortative matching scheme (2) constitute the unique symmetric separating equilibrium to the tournament matching game under NTU. In equilibrium, investment is greater and workers' equilibrium utility is lower than with privately optimum investment, that is,
The proof follows (see the Appendix) from the results of Mailath (1987) on the existence of separating equilibria in standard signaling models. As it is a separating equilibrium, beliefs held by firms about worker quality will be accurate. Specifically, a firm observing a worker who invests x i correctly believes that her quality is z i = x −1 (x i ). On the other hand, it is possible, as in standard signaling models, to construct other equilibria based on different beliefs. For example, a pooling equilibrium, where all workers choose the same investment levelx, can be supported if all firms believe that levels of investment other thanx indicate a low quality worker. Pooling outcomes are further discussed in Section 7.
An important question will be whether separating equilibria are efficient. Compare x(z) with N(z), the amount invested if the assortative matching scheme S(z) was imposed. The above proposition establishes that, from the point of view of workers, they are Pareto ranked. Workers obtain the same match in both cases, but with higher effort in the separating equilibrium. All workers (except the lowest type z) would be better off under N(z). To be clear, this does not imply that N (z) is socially optimal. When investment is productive and enters into the profits of firms (Story B), welfare is a more complex issue. We discuss this further in Section 5 and after.
Transferable Utility
Suppose in contrast to what we have assumed up to now that the surplus created by matching is fully divisible between the two partners. In the labour market we consider, this means workers and firms must bargain over wages. However, even with flexible wages, the job that a worker obtains and her equilibrium utility will still depend on her rank in the distribution of workers. Furthermore, the wage she is paid in equilibrium will depend on both the distribution of worker ability G(z) and the distribution of firm quality H(s).
As Becker (1973) discovered, in this case of transferable utility (TU), assortative matching is only stable if the two attributes, here z and s, are complements in a joint production process. This is in contrast with the situation with the non-transferable utility assumed up to now, where all that was required for stability was that workers' utility was increasing in s and firms' profits were increasing in z. In this section, therefore, some additional assumptions are needed on the production function π(z, s, x): (c) π zs (z, s, x) > 0, π zx (z, s, x) ≥ 0 (complementarity); (d) π sx (z, s, x) = 0 (partial separability); (e) π xx (z, s, x) ≤ 0 (concavity in investment). Condition (c) complementarity will be needed to ensure stability of positive assortative matching. Condition (d) is a convenient simplification that will allow integrability of the wage function. Condition (e) will help in the definition of the privately optimal investment.
Denote the share of this product that goes to the worker as a wage w, and share of the firm, a profit r = π(z, s, x) − w. We now replace the original form of the worker's utility with
which is exactly the form assumed by Spence (1974) . That is, now the worker only values a match in terms of the wages she will receive from that job. The assumptions on the cost function c(z, x) remain the same.
What we again assume is that workers make their choice of investment non-cooperatively.
Then, matching between firms and workers takes place cooperatively in that the outcome is assumed to be stable. In equilibrium, no worker has an incentive to deviate given others' choices and the matching scheme. With transferable utility, for positive assortative matching to be stable, there must exist a way of dividing the product of the match π(z, s, x) in such a way that no worker-firm pair of differing ranks has the incentive to match with each other rather than with a partner of the same rank. To determine this, first, we examine what the conditions for stable assortative matching would be under complete information. Second, we find that, because of the partial separability assumption (d), the stability condition implies a wage schedule w(z, x) that does not depend on the functional form of the workers' strategy x(z). This means that the wage schedule is also applicable in the separating equilibrium of the game of incomplete information. 9 This is possible as in a separating equilibrium, workers' actions fully reveal their underlying type.
The first step in determining the appropriate level of wages under complete information is taken from Becker's (1973) observation that the payment to each partner should be related to her marginal productivity for a matching to be stable. Specifically, for positive assortative matching to be stable, where a worker of type z is matched with a firm of type S(z), it must be that, for a given level of investment x,
That is, the total payoff to a worker of type z +ε and a firm of type S(z) must be greater under the current matching arrangements than the output from a matching between each other. Otherwise, the worker of type z + ε could strike a bargain with the firm of type S(z) whereby they would both be better off. Similarly, if we fix the type of worker at z, for stability given two workers producing output levels x + ε and x, it must be that
In both cases, it is possible to derive equilibrium marginal conditions on the wage function by taking the limit ε to zero. Specifically, in the proof of Proposition 2 below, it is shown that that from (8) and (9) one can derive
Finally, a boundary condition for wage bargaining is needed. Suppose the lowest wage is exogenously fixed at C ≥ 0. It is then possible to integrate the marginal conditions (10) to derive the wage function w(z, x) given below. This in turn will support positive assortative matching as a stable outcome for the matching tournament.
Proposition 2 Let C be an arbitrary constant satisfying 0 ≤ C ≤ π(z, s, 0). Assume complete information and that the workers' strategy x(z) is increasing, then positive assortative matching satisfying the relation (2) is stable given the bargaining solution,
This is the only stable matching.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) offer a much more detailed treatment of a similar problem but where the only the investment x but not the type z matters for the surplus π.
10 The bargaining solution here is complicated by wages potentially depending on both type z and action x. In this context assumption (d) is helpful as it implies that the marginal conditions (10) are integrable. What this means is that it is possible to construct the wage function w(z, x) from the matching function S(z) and the exogenous functions π z , π x , without knowing the equilibrium investment function x(z). In contrast, for example, it is possible to combine the two differential equations (10) into a single one in terms of observable investment, or
where γ(x) = x −1 (x) the inverse of the workers' strategy. But clearly such an approach depends on the strategy x(z). This in turn would require simultaneous solution of the wage schedule and investment strategy, that is solution of the simultaneous differential equations (12) and (14) below. Assumption (d) thus allows the current simpler method at a relatively small cost in loss of generality.
I now turn to incomplete information. Matches will be made and wage bargains struck on the basis of the perceived type of the workers. However, in any separating outcome, the wage equation (11) derived above is still the condition for stability. Firms can observe investment, from investment they can accurately deduce ability. More precisely, if all workers adopt the strictly increasing strategy x(z), in equilibrium firms must believe that a worker choosing investment x(ẑ) is of typeẑ. Note that positive assortative matching is stable under the wage schedule (11) for any positive relationship between investment x and z, independently of its exact functional form. Thus, whatever the separating strategy x(z), if firms offer a wage w(ẑ, x(ẑ)) to a worker with visible investment x(ẑ) then positive assortive matching will be stable. Further, this is the only stable matching.
We now turn to the prior stage where workers choose investment non-cooperatively. I assume a separating strategy x(z) is adopted by all workers and that consequently wages are determined by the wage equation (11) and see if workers have an incentive to deviate. If one worker contemplates a deviation to x(ẑ), that is, investing as if he were of typeẑ, he would then be perceived to be of typeẑ and expect a match with a firm of type S(ẑ) and a payment of w(ẑ, x(ẑ)), even though the actual product of the match will be π(z, S(ẑ), x(ẑ)). This gives a reduced form utility of U = w(ẑ, x(ẑ)) − c(z, x(ẑ)). Differentiate this with respect toẑ and set the resulting derivative to zero, in order for such a deviation not to be profitable. For a symmetric equilibrium, setẑ = z in the first order condition to obtain the following:
Then substituting from (10), one obtains the following differential equation:
To provide a boundary condition for this equation, we need to define a level of investment x which is privately optimal, that is, one that is independent of matching considerations. Assume that the positive assortative matching scheme S(z) is exogenously imposed. This implies that an increase in x can only increase wages by increasing output not by a more favorable match. Or in other words, in the absence of matching considerations we need only consider the partial derivative of wages with respect to output w x (z, x) = π x . This enables the following definition.
Definition 2 Let x = T (z) maximize U = w(z, x) − c(z, x), that is, the complementary slackness condition
holds at every level of z ∈ [z,z]. The function T (z) is called the privately optimal level of investment x under TU.
The above equation has a unique solution by assumption (e) on π(·) and the assumption that c(·) is convex in x. Note that when investment is productive (Story B, π x > 0), then it can be that T (z) > 0. That is, the equilibrium investment by the least able worker may be greater than zero (when π x = 0, T (z) = 0). This is because, with productive investment and transferable utility, additional investment is worthwhile even to the least able as it increases wages. In any case, this privately optimal level of investment will give us the appropriate boundary condition for the equilibrium differential equation, x(z) = T (z). That is, again the lowest ranked worker choose the privately optimal investment. This, together with the earlier Proposition 1, leads to the next result.
Proposition 3 The unique solution to the differential equation (14) with the boundary condition x(z) = T (z), the assortative matching scheme (2) and the wage function (11) constitute a symmetric equilibrium to the tournament matching game with transferable utility. In equilibrium, investment is greater and workers' equilibrium utility is lower than with privately optimum investment, that is, x(z) > T(z) and w(z, x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) < w(z, T (z)) − c(z, T (z)), everywhere on (z,z].
Our equilibrium differential equation (14), while clearly not identical to the differential equation (6) that arose in the NTU case, does depend on the distributions G(z) and H(s) through the function S(z). Hence, both equilibrium payments w(z, x) and the equilibrium strategy x(z) will respond to changes in either in the distribution of ability G(z) or of jobs H(z). But as the equilibrium depends on the wage function w(z, x) that itself depends through the relation (11) on an arbitrary constant C, there can be no claims of uniqueness for the equilibrium constructed above. Later, however, in Section 6, we will see that when there is an excess supply of workers, competition for the available jobs pushes C to zero.
In any case, just as for NTU, the result is that the equilibrium level of investment is excessive from the point of view of workers. All workers (except with the lowest ability z) will invest more than that which is privately optimal. Wages can be higher but the increase in costs is greater so that workers are definitely worse off than with assortative matching and the privately optimal level of investment. Here is a specific example of such an equilibrium.
Example 1 Assume that the production function is π(z, s) = zs + x and that the cost function is c(z, x) = x 2 − xz + x. Assume further that G(·) = H(·) with z = s = 0 so that S(z) = z. From the above analysis, w z (z, x) = S(z) and w x (z, x) = 1, and if w(0, 0) = 0, then w(z, x) = z 2 /2 + x. Note that, solving (15), in this case the privately optimal investment is T (z) = z/2. In contrast, for the noncooperative equilibrium the differential equation (14) is now x 0 (z) = z/(2x − z) with x(0) = 0, which has the solution x(z) = z. Wages, given the privately optimal investment, would be w(z, T (z)) = z 2 /2+z/2 and will be lower at a given level of ability z than in the noncooperative equilibrium, w(z, x(z)) = z 2 /2 + z, as there workers invest more. However, given the additional costs incurred, workers would be better off if all made the privately optimal investment: w(z, T (z)) − c(z, T (z)) = 3z 2 /4 > z 2 /2 = w(z, x(z)) − c(z, x(z)).
We conclude the section with an example that illustrates that relative effects occur in a strictly smaller set of cases under TU than under NTU. Suppose we take a production function where π zs = 0, there are not strict complementarities, we find that the payment to the worker can be determined by her absolute type, even though her equilibrium outcome would be determined by her relative position under NTU.
Example 2 Assume now the production function is π(z, s) = z + s, so that a worker of type z matches with a firm of type s = S(z) together they will produce z + S(z). From the above analysis, w z (z, x) = 1, and if w(0, 0) = 0, then w(z, x) = z. Each worker gets his paid his type irrespective of the particular form of two distributions G(z) and H(s).
Comparative Statics
We will now consider the effect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in the distribution of workers G(z) and changes in the distribution of firms or jobs H(s). In doing this, we consider only separating equilibria. We saw in Sections 2 and 3 that equilibrium behavior depends on the matching function S which is jointly determined by G and H. Our first question is what are the effects of changes in the underlying distributions on the matching function S(z). We will then be better placed to answer questions about changes in equilibrium behavior. In what follows we assume two economies A,B that are identical apart from having different distributions of workers or different distributions of jobs. For investigation of the effect of changes in the degree of inequality amongst workers in a similar framework, see Kornienko (2004, 2005) . For analysis of the effect of changes in the distribution of prizes in tournaments, see Moldovanu and Sela (2006) , an analysis that is expanded to matching tournaments with a finite number of participants in Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2005) .
When we change one distribution we hold the other constant. For example, suppose we considered two distributions of workers G A (z) and G B (z), then the distribution of jobs H(s) is fixed and is the same in both economy A and economy B. Further, I assume that the support of the distribution of workers remains [z,z] and the support of the distribution of jobs is [s,s] . Stochastic dominance is often used to order different distributions. One says one distribution G A stochastically dominates, or is stochastically higher than, another distribution
Here, I employ a modest refinement of stochastic dominance and write
That is, it seems that the comparative statics from changes in H are the reverse to those from changes in G. These results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
NTU
We now see how equilibrium investment and utility respond to changes in the distribution of ability G(z) and the distribution of jobs H(s). Equilibrium utility will be lower in a more competitive environment, that is, if G(z) is stochastically higher or H(s) is stochastically lower. This is not obvious as it is also shown that the effect on investment is not monotone. Low ability workers will invest an amount that is closer to their privately optimal amount in a more competitive economy, and yet they are still worse off. Figure 1 : A worker with given abilityẑ has a match S A under the stochastically higher distribution of ability G A that is worse than the match S B under the lower distribution of ability G B .
The non-monotonicity of investment is easier to explain. Imagine a foot race where a new, very fast runner is added to the field. Those runners who are not very fast realize that the prospects of placing high up the field are even lower and therefore try less hard. Those runners who are competing for the top places realize that competition is now fiercer and respond accordingly.
Let U (z) = b(z, S(z), x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) be a worker's equilibrium utility under NTU. We have by the envelope theorem U 0 (z) = b z (z, S(z), x(z)) − c z (z, x(z)). We first show that an increase in relative competition, in the sense of an increase in the quality of workers or a decrease in the quality of jobs available, reduces equilibrium utility at every level of ability. In what follows, the assumption (iv) on complementarity in benefits and costs will be crucial.
Proposition 4 Suppose that either
The next result shows that an increase in relative competition reduces investment by low ability types, but stimulates greater investment by high types. For this result, I make the further assumption that S 
G(z)
Figure 2: A worker with given abilityẑ has a match S A under the stochastically lower distribution of jobs H A that is worse than the match S B under the higher distribution of jobs H B .
Proposition 5 Suppose that
. Let x A and x B be the solutions to the differential equation (6) under S A (z) and S B (z) respectively. Then, x B (z) > x A (z) on (z,z) for somez > z; there is then at least one crossing of x B (z) and x A (z) on (z,z] so that x A (z) ≥ x B (z).
Note that generically it will hold that x A (z) > x(z), the high ability will invest strictly more in a more competitive environment.
11 But, in general, the comparative statics results on equilibrium investment are less precise than those on equilibrium utility. It is possible to obtain stronger results by making stronger assumptions. See Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) for an example of such an approach.
TU
It is also possible to obtain comparative statics for the model under TU, including what happens to wages when the distributions change. In particular, in a more competitive economy there is lower investment by all types of worker. Investment falls because in a more competitive situation, a worker of given ability obtains a worse job. Because firm quality is a complementary factor to the worker's marginal product π z (z, S(z), x), the 11 We cannot rule out x A (z) = x B (z) because the earlier Proposition 4 allows for the possibility that U A (z) = U B (z). However, this is only possible in the non-generic case where
marginal product falls leading to lower incentives and less effort. It follows that wages are lower at every level of ability.
Proposition 6 Suppose that
. Let x A and x B be the solutions to the differential equation (14) under S A (z) and S B (z) respectively. Then, x B (z) > x A (z) on (z,z).
Define w(z) = w(z, x(z)) as the equilibrium wage schedule. One can then show that when the distribution of ability is stochastically higher, the equilibrium wage is lower at each level of ability.
Proposition 7 Suppose that
. Let w A (z) and w B (z) be the equilibrium wage schedules under S A (z) and S B (z) respectively. Then,
In Spence's (1973 Spence's ( , 1974 original work, the wage schedule was written in terms of visible investment or education x. Here, we have w
, the inverse of the equilibrium strategy x(z). With substitution from the differential equation (14) we have
The wage schedule will be a solution to this differential equation with boundary condition w(x(z)) = C. This can be used to show again that greater competition depresses wages.
Proposition 8 Suppose that
. Let w A (x) and w B (x) be the equilibrium wage schedules in terms of investment x under S A (z) and S B (z) respectively. Then,
These results on investment and wages in turn imply a similar result on workers' utility. Let U(z) = w(z, x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) be workers' equilibrium utility under TU. Equilibrium utility will be lower at every level of ability in a more competitive economy.
Proposition 9
Suppose either G A (z) first order stochastically dominates G B (z), or H B (z) first order stochastically dominates H A (z). Then, U A (z) < U B (z) for all z in (z,z).
Comparing NTU and TU
We have seen that there are different comparative statics when wages are flexible (TU) than when they are not (NTU). In particular, a more competitive environment, such as a stochastically higher distribution of worker ability, produces uniformly lower investment under TU but higher investment by the high ability under NTU. Let us look at what is driving this difference.
Suppose we take very simple formulations. For the NTU case, let b(z, s, x) = s, the benefit of holding a job is simply equal to the quality of the employer. Then, we can write the equilibrium differential equation (6) as
Similarly, for expository purposes, suppose simply that π(z, s, x) = zs, then the differential equation for the TU case (14) can be written
In both cases, we have the marginal cost of increasing investment x on the left hand side, and the marginal benefit on the right.
In the TU case, the marginal benefit is proportional to S(z) (or more generally π z (z, S(z), x)), and will be lower everywhere in a more competitive environment (see, for example, Figure 1 ). Under TU, incentives are driven by the wage which is determined by a worker's marginal product. In a more competitive environment, a worker of a given ability gains a lower value match. Since the employer type is a strict complement, the worker's marginal product falls, lowering the incentive to invest at all levels of ability.
However, in an NTU world, the marginal return depends on S 0 (z), the marginal return to moving up in terms of one's match. Again using the metaphor of a foot race, replacing low quality runners with high quality runners increases the relative density of competitors at high ability levels and reduces it at low levels. The incentive to invest is increased for the high ability and reduced for the low ability.
Efficiency
In this section, I look at the efficiency of equilibrium investment decisions. Given the presence of incomplete information, it is no surprise that full social efficiency is not obtained. However, what is interesting is the application of the novel comparative statics techniques introduced in the previous section to see whether efficiency increases or decreases as the distributions of workers and jobs change.
If there are complementarities between firms and workers then from the results of Becker (1973) , the maximization of total output demands the positive assortative matching scheme S(z). Since matching is efficient, this allows us to concentrate on a different issue: whether, for each pair formed under this scheme, the worker chooses a level of investment that is optimal from the point of view of joint welfare. Which will be the case is not obvious as there are two factors that work in opposite directions. First, workers are unlikely to internalize the benefit of the effect of additional investment on the profits of firms, leading to too little investment. That is, there is a form of hold-up problem. Second, competition between workers for matching opportunities can push investment up, possibly to excessive levels. In the case of complete information, Cole et al. (2001) find that as investment raises one's marginal product, which in a TU framework leads to higher wages, this solves the first problem. Thus, efficient investment is possible even without enforceable contracts (see also Peters and Siow (2002) ). However, Peters (2004) finds that, in a NTU framework, again under complete information, the second factor is stronger than the first, and investment is inefficiently high.
Turning to the tournaments under incomplete information considered here, we have already seen that investment is excessive from the point of view of workers. This leads immediately to the result that when such investment is not useful for firms (Story A), its equilibrium level is also socially excessive.
12 But it is possible to show that, under TU, investment is still too high even when investment is productive. In contrast, under NTU, I find productive investment under some circumstances will be too low.
This difference arises because what is privately optimal is also socially optimal under TU, but is too low under NTU. The lowest ranked individual in both cases will choose what is privately optimal. Thus, under NTU we start too low, and under TU we start just right. As non-cooperative investment for higher levels of ability rises above the privately optimal level, under TU investment will be too high everywhere, while under NTU we may eventually rise above the social optimum at high levels of ability.
As the tournament becomes more competitive, the two cases diverge. As we have seen in the previous section, greater competition lowers the quality of job obtained for a given level of ability. This lowers a worker's marginal product, leading to reduced investment under TU. Thus, investment will become closer to the optimum. Under NTU, greater competition discourages the low ability and their investment falls, even though it is too low already. However, high ability workers will invest more under greater competition even though their investment may already be excessive. Thus, under NTU, greater competition can lead to greater inefficiency. Notice, however, we have already seen that under both TU and NTU, this increase in competition makes workers worse off (Propositions 4 and 9). So, any gains in efficiency in the TU case do not go to workers.
NTU
Under NTU, as we have already seen (Proposition 1), the lowest ability worker has no incentive to invest more than is privately optimal. As we will now see, as under Story B, such investment would benefit her employer, this level of investment is inadequate from a social point of view. In contrast, for higher ability workers competition for matches raises investment above privately optimal levels, and possibly above socially optimal levels too.
Let us assume that the total welfare of an individual match between a firm and worker is given by a weighted sum of the worker's utility and the firm's profit
for some β > 0. For example, if the benefits to a worker are a fixed proportion of the product b(z, s, x) = απ(z, s, x) then β = 1 − α. Then the first order conditions for an interior solution to a social planner's choice of investment are
Note that if π x is zero, so that x is non-productive, the social optimum requires x to be equal to the privately optimal level N(z) (which may be zero). Then, immediately by Proposition 1, we have the unsurprising result that since investment is socially unproductive, in equilibrium its supply is excessive. However, if we make the assumption that investment is productive or π x > 0, then comparison of (5) and (20) leads directly to the next result.
Proposition 10 Assume conditions (c)-(e) on π(·) and that π x (z, s, x) > 0. Then there exists a unique solution x = N * (z) > 0 to the equation (20) at each level of z. For low types the non-cooperative level of investment x(z) is less than the social optimum N * (z). That is, there is an
That is, low types invest too little as their low prospects give no incentive to do more than which is privately optimal. However, one can also see that there is no fundamental reason why high types should also invest too little. We imagine that typically they will invest too much. Particularly, if the production function is strictly concave, then as the marginal product of investment falls, the socially optimal investment will approach the privately optimal level for high x.
The results on investment do have a striking conclusion, as illustrated in Figure  3 . In the more competitive environment, which has a matching function S A (z) that is worse from the point of view of workers, distortions from the socially optimal are larger. In particular, the low type workers who in any case invest too little will invest even less. And the high ability workers who may put in too much effort will do even more. Note that Figure 3 illustrates only one particular scenario: in general, there is no assurance that there will not be multiple crossings of x A and x B and N * .
TU
Under TU, the welfare results are quite different. The fact that wages respond to productive investment gives a natural incentive to invest. Unfortunately, under incomplete information, investment also serves to gain an improved match, which leads to excess investment. The total payoff of a match is given by
as the sum of wages and profits must equal output π(·). Thus the complementary slackness condition for a social optimum, conditional on positive assortative matching, is
That is, when x is a productive investment, the social optimum equates the marginal cost of investment to the worker c x and its marginal product π x . Note that under TU, this condition is the same as for the privately optimal level of investment T (z). This reflects the results of CMP (2001), who find that with complete information, a matching tournament can induce the efficient amount of investment.
However, under incomplete information there is a gap between private incentives and the social optimum. This is because each individual has an additional private return from increasing investment as it permits a better match. However, a change in either the distribution of jobs or workers that induces greater competition pushes investment closer to the socially optimal level.
Proposition 11
In the matching tournament with incomplete information and under TU, the equilibrium level of investment x(z) exceeds the socially optimal level T * (z) almost everywhere. To compare two tournaments A,B assume either
Unemployment
Up to now, it has been assumed that all workers are matched to jobs. Obviously, it is a characteristic of many real world labour markets that the least successful candidates fail to attract any offers as there are more candidates than there are job openings. It is relatively easy to modify the basic matching tournament model to allow for this. We find again that the model delivers sensible comparative statics. For example, a decrease in the number of jobs available relative to the number of workers will, in the TU case, lower wages at every level of ability.
Assume now that that the measure of firms relative to that of workers is 1 − µ so that a proportion 1 > µ > 0 of workers will not find employment. Under assortative matching, these will be the least able, so that those having ability on the range [z,ẑ), where G(ẑ) = µ, will be unemployed. The matching value of unemployment we take to be s 0 , where 0 ≤ s 0 ≤ s. That is, the value in terms of s of unemployment is worse than the value of the least attractive job. Together this implies the following assortative matching scheme
This implies that S 0 (z) is equal to zero on [z,ẑ) and to
The principal interest is the effect of increased scarcity of jobs on equilibrium outcomes. An increase in µ in this framework is like a proportional increase in the population of workers at every level of ability, while keeping the distribution of available jobs fixed. An increase in unemployment increases competition for jobs. It is possible to show that the comparative static effects are similar to those found in Section 4.
NTU
Again it is possible to construct a symmetric separating equilibrium based on assortative matching. Those workers who anticipate unemployment will not invest any more than the privately optimal level. However, if the privately optimal solution N(z) is increasing in ability, this will still be separating. A greater problem is that if the worst job is strictly better than unemployment, there must be a jump in the equilibrium strategy x(z) atẑ to prevent unemployed workers imitating the investment levels of those who are successful. It is still possible for there to be a pure strategy equilibrium, provided one provides suitable off-equilibrium beliefs.
. Let x(z) be the solution to (6) on [ẑ,z] with boundary condition x(ẑ) =x. Then, x(z), together with the matching scheme (23), is a symmetric equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under NTU under Story A or B.
The obvious question is what happens if the ratio of workers to jobs increases. Clearly, unemployment goes up, but we can also show that worker utility falls as the job market becomes more competitive. Further, it discourages effort for the lowly ranked, but increases investment by the high ranked. Define G(ẑ i ) = µ i for i = A, B. With higher µ, the ability level of the lowest ranked worker to find employment will be also be higher, so thatẑ A >ẑ B if µ A > µ B .
Proposition 13 Suppose µ A > µ B and let x A (z), U A (z) and x B (z), U B (z) be the equilibrium strategy and utility respectively under the two respective values of µ. Then,
but there is at least one crossing so that x A (z) ≥ x B (z).
TU
Under TU, assume that the µ unmatched workers are paid according to the wage equation (11), but under the basis that their match has value s 0 as specified in the matching scheme (23). This implies there may be a discontinuity in the equilibrium product π(z, S(z), x(z)) atẑ as S(z) jumps from s 0 to s. Note, however, for a pure strategy equilibrium we need continuity in the wage schedule. This is possible, despite the jump in the product atẑ, if the worst firm appropriates the entire surplus of the match with the worst employed worker, so that the worst employed worker is paid no more than the unemployed. If the worst job did pay more, then the mass of unemployed would be happy to raise investment above the privately optimal level in order to get that job. At least this competition for the worst job ties down the value for the constant C in the wage equation (11) to be zero. We then have the following equilibrium. Proposition 14 Let x(z) = T (z) on [z,ẑ) where µ = G(ẑ). Let w(z, x) be given by (11) but with S(z) as given in (23) and C = 0. Let x(z) be the solution to (14) on [ẑ,z] with boundary condition x(ẑ) = T (ẑ). Then, x(z) is a symmetric equilibrium strategy of the matching tournament under TU.
It is also possible to show that an increase in unemployment will lower equilibrium wages and utility. Investment falls at each ability level as well.
Proposition 15 Suppose µ A > µ B , let G(ẑ i ) = µ i for i = A, B, and let w A (z), x A (z), U A (z) and w B (z), x B (z), U B (z) be the equilibrium wage, strategy and utility respectively under the two respective values of µ. Then,
Other Signaling and Matching Models
In the signaling model introduced by Spence (1973) in a separating equilibrium, the worker is paid his marginal product which is revealed by the equilibrium strategy. In the case of a continuum of types, Mailath (1987) gives the equivalent conditions. Mailath assumes an agent's utility is given by a utility function of the form V (z,ẑ, x), whereẑ is the agent's perceived type, and consistent with current notation z is her true type and x her action chosen. Our current model differs in that the reward structure does not depend on the (inferred) type of an agent, rather it depends on his apparent rank. That is, here equilibrium payoffs depend on G(ẑ), or perceived rank in the distribution of workers, or from (4), U(z, H −1 (G(ẑ)), x). Interestingly, therefore, the matching tournament induces workers to appear as though they had preferences over rank or relative position in that equilibrium utility is increasing in one's rank G(z).
However, as Mailath's formulation is quite general, it does not rule out dependence of payoffs on the distribution of types. That is, mathematically speaking, payoffs of the form U(z, H −1 (G(ẑ)), x) are a special case of a function of the form V (z,ẑ, x). Nonetheless, it has been a well-established tradition that job market signaling depends only on the signaler's absolute type. Equally, it is true that utility of the form U (z,ẑ, x) is a special case of U (z, S(ẑ), x). In particular, if we constrain the distributions so that G(·) = H(·), then S(z) = z, and any dependence on the distributions disappear. As we have seen in Section 4, changes in the two distributions have opposite effects. Thus, if the two distributions are constrained to be equal to each other, a movement of one distribution is cancelled out by the movement of the other. This current signaling model like the standard one has pooling equilibria. An equilibrium where all workers choose the same investment levelx, can be supported if all firms believe that levels of investment other thanx indicate a low quality worker. Since all firms consequently view all workers as being equally able (and all have the same investment), any matching, including random matching, would be stable. In the TU case, wages would reflect average productivity. In that sense, it is true that pooling equilibria, of the current or classic model, do respond to changes in demand and supply that affect average productivity. In particular, an increase in the quality of workers would lead to an increase in wages while investment would remain fixed across all workers. In contrast, in the separating equilibrium we examine, we have seen that investment would change, and wages would fall at each level of ability.
In a different context, Costrell and Loury (2004) examine a matching model where indeed the distribution of worker ability does have an impact on outcomes. A continuum of workers is matched with a continuum of jobs and wages are set in similar way to the TU model described in Section 3. Thus, it is possible to carry out some of the same comparative static exercises as considered here, for example, what is the impact on wages if the distribution of ability becomes stochastically higher. However, they assume complete information and matching is on the basis of intrinsic worker quality and there are no worker investment decisions. Hence, necessarily there are no comparative static results on investment or on welfare. The latter is because in their model all stable matchings are efficient. Finally, they see the matching process between workers and jobs to be internal to a firm, rather than an external job market as considered here. This is important as they assume a zero profit condition for the firm. Thus, for example, if worker quality rises, wages must fall for high ability workers and rise for the low ability in order to keep total profits zero as total output rises. Here in contrast, there is a fall in wages at every ability level (Proposition 7).
Finally, it may be helpful to distinguish the current work from two other recent papers on matching tournaments. Hopkins and Kornienko (2006) is focussed on using the matching tournament model in its NTU version to investigate questions of inequality. In contrast, inequality is not dealt with here. Second, Hopkins and Kornienko (2006) uses a different comparative static methodology, comparing investment choices and equilibrium utility at a constant rank in the distribution rather than at a constant level of ability as is done here. Hoppe et al. (2005) examines matching tournaments with incomplete information under NTU with a finite number of participants. The principal difference in approach is to assume linear utility which permits an explicit solution for the competitors' equilibrium strategy. Comparative statics can be done directly, rather than use the qualitative approach taken here.
Conclusions
This paper has introduced a model of relative signaling in a tournament-like labour market. By allowing for vertical differentiation amongst employers as well as workers, it generalizes the classic model of Spence (1973) . Competition for good jobs generates competition for relative position, implying that the outcome for any individual worker depend on the distribution of characteristics of all firms and all workers. It is true that these relative effects are known to exist in matching and assignment models, see, for example, Costrell and Loury (2004) . However, in the assignment literature, matching is based on the intrinsic characteristics of workers and jobs. Therefore there is no explicit competition between workers, no comparative statics on workers' education decisions and no welfare analysis, as everything is efficient. Here, matching is based on investment decisions by workers that are driven by the matching opportunities available. This in turn differentiates the model from traditional signaling models, as here changes in either the distribution of firms and workers, representing changes in the demand and supply of labour respectively, affect equilibrium strategies and welfare.
The equilibria in this model, as is common under imperfect information, are not efficient. Workers may overinvest in education because it serves as a signal of ability as well as increasing productivity. The innovation here is to show that, when the job market is a tournament, this inefficiency depends on the distribution of ability. As Frank (1997) has observed, such positional competition has externalities which could potentially be lessened by taxation. That is, suitable labour taxes could increase rather than decrease labour market efficiency. One of the contributions of this paper is to refine previous arguments that have focussed on the case where position is signaled by wasteful activities, such as conspicuous consumption. In fact, it is when signaling is in the form of a productive activity such as education that the current model of positional competition gives the greatest support for redistributive taxation.
13 This is because in the equilibrium of the matching tournament analysed here, low ability workers can underinvest in developing useful skills, and high ability workers may overinvest from a social point of view. Hence, a progressive tax and subsidy scheme might reduce those distortions.
In some research in incomplete information, lack of dependence on the distribution of types is taken to be an advantage. However, this is in the context of a different type of signaling model. Take for example a classic industrial organization model of limit pricing where an incumbent monopolist signals unobservable costs by its choice of price. Note that in this case the distribution of types is the potential entrant's subjective beliefs about the unknown costs of the incumbent. The probability distribution in this case is subjective and largely unobservable as it is in the mind of the entrant. In contrast, in the labour market model considered here, the approach to beliefs is in effect frequentist as the distribution of types is simply the empirical distribution of workers' qualities. The dependence on the type distribution is more natural in this context, where the distribution is observable and measurable.
I also hope that matching tournaments will provide a useful framework for the analysis of a number of labour market issues. Issues of inequality in matching tournaments are examined in Hopkins and Kornienko (2007) . Another potential question is that it is sometimes argued that "globalization" has increased dispersion in earnings. In this paper already, it has been shown that greater competition can induce greater dispersion in educational investment with those at the bottom end of the labour market investing less and the high ability investing more. It is also shown that the labour market response will depend on the degree of wage flexibility. For example, where wages are not fully flexible, this increase in competition will actually worsen the efficiency of investment decisions. This suggests that the effects of globalization will be different in countries that have flexible labour markets than in those where labour markets are more regulated. But to address these issues more fully, further work is necessary to develop the analysis of the simultaneous determination of education and wages, an issue that has only received an initial treatment here.
(1987, p1352) on V .
14 Condition (1) is that V is C 2 , condition (2) is that V 2 is always non-zero, and here V 2 = b z > 0. Condition (3) is that V 13 is never zero and here V 13 = b zx − c zx > 0. Since here V 33 < 0, Mailath's condition (5) that V 3 is bounded when V 33 ≥ 0 is automatically satisfied.
Mailath's condition (4) requires that V 3 (z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x which maximizes V (z, z, x). If b x > 0, then this follows from the assumptions that b xx ≤ 0, and the assumption that c is convex in x. However, if b x = 0, then the maximizer of V (z, z, x) with respect to x is x = N(z) = 0. This actually makes equivalent results to Mailath's easier. In particular, Mailath's Proposition 3 that establishes that, in current notation,
This also obviates the need for Mailath's Proposition 5 as the simpler differential equation
Finally, to show that workers are worse off than under privately optimal investment, denote
be equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal investment N(z) respectively. Since N(z) maximizes a worker's utility given match S(z) and x(z) > N(z) for all z ∈ (z,z), the result follows. . Following Becker (1973) (see also Sattinger (1979) , CMP (2001)), one obtains from (8),
Proof of Proposition 2:
Dividing both sides by and taking the limit of to zero, one finds that
Similarly from (9), one obtains
This also give us a bound on the total derivative dw(z, x)/dz ≥ π z + π x x 0 . A similar analysis finds that the share of the firm satisfies
But since dw(z, x)/dz + dr(z, x)/dz = dπ(z, S(z), x)/dz = π x x 0 (z) + π z + S 0 (z)π s , the above conditions hold with equality. The choice of the boundary condition C = w(z, 0) is arbitrary, except that it must be feasible, i.e. 0 ≤ w(z, 0) ≤ π(z, s, 0).
We check that these marginal conditions imply general as well as local stability (that is, it is not possible to construct a blocking pair even when one can choose any type, 14 Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (1987 , also assumes that ∂V /∂ẑ is bounded. Here, if we assume that both b s and S 0 (z) are bounded (the latter requires g(·) is bounded and h(·) is non-zero), this result will also hold.
and not just within a radius of ε). Take any two types of worker z 1 , z 2 with z 2 > z 1 . The stability condition (8) can be rewritten as
Now, as matching is positive and assortative, the matching function S(z) is increasing and S(z) > S(z 1 ) for any z ∈ (z 1 , z 2 ]. If, as assumed, π zs > 0 then the above inequality must hold for any pair z 2 > z 1 .
To prove that positive assortative matching is only stable form of matching, suppose that instead there is a matchingφ that is not positive assortative. LetS(z) =φ(G(z)). Then, one can choose z 2 > z 1 such thatS(z 2 ) <S(z) for all z on the interval (z 1 , z 2 ). For this matching to be stable, given z 2 > z 1 , wages must satisfy the inequality (8) and, hence, the inequality (27) withS(·) replacing S(·). But asS(z 2 ) <S(z 1 ) and given the complementarity assumptions (c) on π(·), this inequality is clearly violated. Thus, positive assortative matching again is the only stable matching.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The aim is again to apply the results of Mailath (1987) . Fix S(z), given the two exogenous distributions G(z) and H(s). Then, from the exogenous partial derivatives given in (10), one can integrate using formula (11) to obtain w(z, x) as a smooth increasing function [z,z] × IR :7 → IR (on integrability, see, for example, Varian (1992, pp483-4) ). Given this wage function, a worker of perceived typeẑ will have utility U = w(ẑ, x) − c(z, x). In a symmetric equilibrium, the lowest type worker has a match s and therefore should choose x to maximize U (z, w(z, x), x), that is choose T (z), which confirms the boundary condition. Furthermore, define utility function V (·) as V (z,ẑ, x) = w(ẑ, x) − c(z, x). Then it is easy to verify that our assumptions on c(·) and π(·) imply Mailath's (1987 conditions (1)- (5) on V . In particular, note that V 2 = w z = π z > 0, V 13 = −c zx > 0 and that V 3 = π x − c x . Mailath's condition (4) requires that V 3 (z, z, x) = 0 has a unique solution. If π x > 0 then this follows from the assumptions that π xx ≤ 0, and the assumption that c is convex in x.
15 However, if π x = 0 we have the situation that V 3 (z, z, x) < 0 and T (z) = 0. But as established in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to adapt Mailath's proofs to this slightly different case. Existence of an incentive compatible signaling equilibrium then follows from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath. It is then easy to adapt the proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987 to show that x(z) > T (z) on (z,z).
Finally, to show that workers are worse off than under privately optimal investment, denote U(z) = w(z, , x(z)) − c(z, x(z)) and U T (z) = w(z, T (z)) − c(z, T (z)) be equilibrium utility and utility under privately optimal investment T (z) respectively. Since T (z) maximizes a worker's utility given the wage schedule w(z, x) as defined in (11) and x(z) > N(z) for all z ∈ (z,z), the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The first claim follows as since H(·) is a strictly increasing function so is H −1 (·). Therefore, if for any z, G A (z) < G B (z) then S A (z) < S B (z). 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Note that the function U(z) is continuously differentiable as x(z) and S(z) are continuously differentiable. Given that the boundary condition x(z) = N(z) is the same in any equilibrium, we have U A (z) = U B (z). In equilibrium, x(z) > N(z) (except at z). It then follows from assumption (v) that U x (z, S(z), x(z)) = b x (z, S(z), x(z)) − c x (z, x(z)) is strictly negative.
Note that any point where U A (z) = U B (z) on (z,z), given that S A (z) < S B (z) it must be that x A (z) < x B (z). But then as U 0 (z) is strictly increasing in x(z) and increasing in S(z) by assumption (iv), it must be that U 0 A (z) < U 0 B (z) at any point of crossing. Therefore, there can be only one crossing of U A (z) by U B (z) and that must be from below. We now rule out the remaining possibility that U A (z) ≥ U B (z) on an interval [z, z 1 ] with z 1 ≤z. On the interior of the interval, again we have S A (z) < S B (z) and, therefore, to make it possible that U A (z) ≥ U B (z), it must be that x A (z) < x B (z). This implies that U So, x B (z) > x A (z) holds immediately to the right of z. Suppose there is no crossing on (z,z], so that x A (z) < x B (z) which implies that, as S A (z) = S B (z) = s, the utility for the highest type must be ranked U A (z) > U B (z), which is a contradiction to our earlier result, Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6: Given the common boundary condition that x A (z) = x B (z) = T (z) and that S A (z) = S B (z) = s, evaluating the differential equation (14) 
Proof of Proposition 7:
From the earlier Proposition 6, we have x A (z) < x B (z) on (z,z). This implies that, in the wage equation (11), the second integral on the righthand side is strictly lower in case A than in B. But as S A (z) < S B (z) on (z,z), the first integral is lower by assumption (c) on π(·).
Proof of Proposition 8:
From the earlier Proposition 6, we have x A (z) < x B (z) on (z,z) with x A (z) = x B (z) = x(z). This implies that γ A (x) > γ B (x) on (x(z), x A (z)). Now, since c zx < 0 by assumption, we have from the wage equation (16) Proof of Proposition 9: Given the original definition of worker's utility (7), the envelope theorem implies that U 0 (z) = −c z (z, x(z)) > 0. By the above Proposition 9, x A (z) < x B (z) for all z ∈ (z,z]. By assumption, it holds that c zx < 0. Therefore, U 0 A (z) = −c z (z, x A (z)) < −c z (z, x B (z)) = U 0 B (z) for all z ∈ (z,z). As U A (z) = U B (z) by the common boundary condition x(z) = T (z), the result clearly follows.
Proof of Proposition 10:
The concavity of U in x and the concavity of π together ensure the first order conditions (20) define a maximum. We have, for the lowest type, x(z) = N(z) by Proposition 1. However, at z, as π x > 0, for a social optimum from (20), the lowest type should produce more than N(z). The final result follows from application of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Existence of a unique solution T * (z) to (22) at every level of z follows from assumption (e) on π(·) and the convexity of c(z, x) in x. The first result then follows directly from comparison of (13) and (22). The comparative static result follows from Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 12: First, note that, in the proposed equilibrium, investment levels on the interval (N(ẑ),x) are off the equilibrium path. Assume that if any worker deviates and chooses x on that interval, firms believe with probability 1 that her type z is strictly less thanẑ. Then any deviation by any unemployed worker to any level of x in [0,x) will not result in a job offer. There is, therefore, no incentive to make such a deviation. Deviation to a level of x abovex is unprofitable by the definition ofx. For workers of type z ∈ [ẑ,z], the equilibrium is the same as in the case of full employment.
Proof of Proposition 13: Note that while equilibrium investment x(z) can be discontinuous atẑ, the definition ofx ensures that U(z) is continuous. It is also differentiable except perhaps atẑ. Given S A (z) < S B (z) on (ẑ B ,z), a proof of the claim that U A (z) < U B (z) for all z ∈ (ẑ B ,z) is then readily derivable from the proof of Proposition 4, simply replacing z withẑ B at each point of the proof. Proof of the second part, concerning x A (z) and x B (z), similarly follows from Proposition 5. Proof of Proposition 15: Note that, while S A (ẑ B ) = S B (ẑ B ), it holds that S A (z) < S B (z) on (ẑ B , z]. Second, in equilibrium x A (z) = T (z) < x B (z) on (ẑ B ,ẑ A ] by Proposition 3. Then, by the argument in Proposition 6, there can be no crossing of x A (z) and x B (z) on (ẑ A ,z). Thus, x B (z) > x A (z) on (ẑ B , z) . The results on equilibrium wages and utility then follow from Propositions 7 and 9, replacing each instance of z in the proof withẑ B .
